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IN THE S·UPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GLEN L. NIC.EWINTER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
Case No.
7669

DAVID H. NICEWINTER and
GENEVA C. NICEWINTER,
Defendants and Appellants.

MARIE M. DIENER,
Defendant.

APPELLANTS BRIEF

~STATEMENT

OF FACTS

On September 25, 1947, the appellants, David H.
Nicewinter and Geneva C. Nicewinter, his wife, entered
into a contract (R. 19) to purchase from Marie M.
Diener for the total sum of $11,500.00 the following
described property:
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Commencing at a point 2 rds. North of the
Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18, Plat "A",
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North
4 rds. ; thence East 10 rds. ; thence South 4 rds.;
thence West 10 rds. to the place of beginning.
The contract designated the purchasers as joint
tenants and not as tenants in common, with full rights
of survivorship. Situated on the property is a nine unit
apartment house building.
Subsequently, one of the appellants, David H. Nicewinter, and his brother, Glen L. Nicewinter, the appellee,
discussed the possibility of admitting appellee into the
apartment house venture, with each to contribute funds,
services and materials, and each to participate in the
distribution of profits, if any, arising out of the venture.
An understanding was reached as a result of these
discussions on or about the 23rd day of February, 1948,
and the two brothers commenced operating, repairing
and renovating the apartment house together at about
that time.
Disagreements subsequently developed between
them, and in order to obtain an adjudication of his
alleged claims, the appellee brought suit against David
H. Nicewinter, Geneva C.. Nicewinter and Marie M.
Diener, the vendor of the property. As a result of this
action, findings of fact (R. 6) and conclusions of law
(R. 8), and decree (R. 4), were entered on April 29,
1950. This decree adjudged, among other things, that
the plaintiff and the defendant David Nicewinter "have
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a joint venture in the purchase, in1proven1ent and sale"
of the above described real property. No mention was
n1ade in the decree of the interest in the business of the
defendant, Geneva Nicewinter. This decree also provided (R. 5), that the profits and increase of value of
said pre1nises should be divided share and share alike
upon sale thereof (though no mention is made as to the
parties \Yho shall share in such division) ; that each of
said brothers (presumably Glen L. and David H. Nicewinter) should have reasonable living quarters out of
the premises pending sale thereof, and that within a
reasonable time said premises should be sold, and an
accounting be rendered (though the language of this
portion of the decree is uncertain by virtue of omitted
words); that in such accounting, each of the brothers
should receive credit for an equal amount of work
between February 23, 1948, and November 30, 1949,
and that Glen L. Nicewinter should be repaid all monies
and property put into the enterprise in the event the
sale did not produce enough to repay the contributions
of said venturers. No mention is made of the interests
of either Geneva C. Nicewinter or l\{arie M. Diener.
While it is true that this previous judgment, rendered April 29, 1950, is not the one here involved, the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree were
pleaded in the suit which is the subject of this appeal,
and proper consideration of the problem presented by
the decree herein, must necessarily refer to this previous
decree.
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Following the adjudication of this initial case, a
second action ( R. 1), was filed by the same plaintiff
against the same defendants, and a decree (R. 30) in
the second action was made and entered on February 21,
1951. It is with such second decree that this appeal is
directly concerned.
Appellants freely confess that it is most difficult to
present the facts underlying this case, because in a
literal sense of the word, there was no evidence introduced in this action, and the matter was submitted to
the trial court for decision upon a stipulation (R. 20),
which is limited in extent and by no means clear, as
will be pointed out in the argument. It is with extreme
reluctance and hesitancy that appellants refer to matters outside the record, but unfortunately, there would
seem to be no alternative.
Subsequent to the time that this case was at issue,
the written stipulation was presented to the court, which
stipulation reads in essential part as follows:
"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND
AGREED that said contract shall be delivered to
the clerk of Judge Ray Van Cott's court by attorney Franklin Dunn Richards on or before the
13th day of February, 1951, and that the above
entitled court by said Judge may sell said property and all interest therein to the highest bidder
as between plaintiff Glen L. Nicewinter and
David H. Nicewinter as defendant."
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So far as \Ve are now advised, at the same time
that the written stipulation was presented, there were
some informal discussions bet,veen counsel of record at
that time for all parties, and the court, in regard to
the case. The record, ho\vever, is silent as to the effect
or substance of these informal discussions, and there
seen1s to be no order based thereon other than the ultimate decree (R. 30), which was made and entered on
February 21, 1951.
This decree provided that the premises involved
should be sold at the courtroom of the trial court at
9 :15 A.M. on Friday, March 9, 1951, and that notice of
such sale be given by serving upon appellants' attorney
a five-day notice prior to sale. The premises described
included not only the real property, but also the furniture, furnishings and appliances located therein. The
decree further provided that the property be sold only
to the highest bidder as between appellee, Glen L. Nice\Vinter, and one of the appellants, David H. Nicewinter,
and that the liquidated sum of $8,000.00 due the said
Glen L. Nicewinter, as allegedly adjudged by previous
decree of court dated April 29, 1950, might be applied
as cash by appellee in bidding at said sale. The decree
further provided that within five days after sale, the
unsuccessful bidder vacate and deliver up possession of
the property to the successful bidder, and that proceeds
of sale be deposited with the Clerk of Court for disposition in accordance with an account to be subsequently adjudicated.
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At the time of the sale on March 9, 1951, at 9:30
A.M., present counsel for the appellants moved for a
continuance of the sale until 1 :30 P.M. the same day, a
request made subsequent to a previous request to the
court to withhold sale until disposition of a prospective
motion for a new trial (R. 48). The trial court granted
the continuance to 1 :30 P.M., and, in the interim, this
appeal was perfected.
At the time of the hearing on the sale of March 9,
1951, at 9 :30 A.M., appellee called to the witness stand
Marie M. Diener, the owner of the real property, who
testified as to details of the contract of sale between
herself as seller and David H. and Geneva C. Nicewinter,
as buyers, and the then existent balance due thereon
of $2,900.00 (R. 47). At this time also, the contract of
sale, Exhibit "A", was introduced in evidence. This
brief testimony and exhibit constitute all of the testimony and the exhibit introduced in the case.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
BY APPELLANTS
Appellants rely upon the following points:
POINT No. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE DECREE (R. 30, 31), THE
SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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POINT No. 2
TilE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERJNG PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 23),
'l'HE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

POINT No. 3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF L.AW
(R. 23), THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR THE EVIDENCE.

POINT No.4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER.ING PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE DECREE (R. 31), THE .SAME
BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR
THE EVIDENCE.

POINT No. 5
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(R. 24), THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE
FINDINGS OF FACT OR THE EVIDENCE.

POINT No. 6
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22),
THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

POINT No. 7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22),
THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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POINT No.8
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22),
THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

POINT No. 9
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 23),
THE SAME BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
Points Nos. 1, 2 and 3
Paragraph 11 of the findings of fact (R. 23), paragraph 1 of the conclusions of law (R. 23), and paragraph
1 of the decree (R. 30, 31), upon which the above points
are based, are concerned with essentially the same matter, and will be argued together. For the convenience
of the court, these paragraphs are set forth as follows:
Findings of Fact
"11. That said decree further provided that
plaintiff should be repaid all monies and property
which he has put into said enterprise in the event
there was not enough to repay both of them for
all their contributions thereto, and said monies
and property to be repaid has been determined
by Decree of this court to be adjudicated to be a
sum of $8,000.00 to be repaid in the event there
was not even enough to repay both of them for
all their contributions thereto."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

Conclusions of Law
"That all interest of Glen L. Nicewinter and
David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C. Nicewinter
in and to the hereinafter described real property
together with the contract for the purchase thereof fron1 niarie ~1. Diener should be sold to the
highest bidder of the said Glen L. Nicewinter
and David H. Nicewinter in open court for cash
and that the liquidated sum of $8,000.00 due to
the said Glen L. Nicewinter may be applied as
cash in the bidding at said sale, and * * •"
Decree
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that all interest of Glen L. Nicewinter and David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C.
Nicewinter in and to the real property located
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and described
hereinafter be sold to the highest bidder as be-,
tween the said Glen L. Nicewinter and David H.
Nicewinter in open court for cash, and that the
liquidated sun1 of $8,000.00 due to the said Glen
L. Nicewinter as adjudged by this court by Decree
dated the 28th day of April, 1950, may be applied
by him as cash in bidding at said sale, and * * *"
Although it does not so specify, paragraph 11 of
the findings probably refers to the decree in the previous
action (R. 25), dated April 29, 1950. That previous
decree, however, does not contain a single word as to
the fact that the sum of $8,000.00 was due to the said
Glen L. Nicewinter, or that such a sum was "to be
repaid in the event there was not even enough to repay
both of them for all their contributions thereto." It is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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difficult to conceive how any court could enter such finding, as there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record
to support the same.
Paragraph 1 of the decree not only repeats this
error, but compounds the same. In addition to finding
that the su1n of $8,000.00 is due, the decree goes on to
provide that this amount might be used at the courtroom
sale by appellee as a cash credit. Again, appellants
assert that there is no basis in law or fact upon which
such a provision could be based. Paragraph 1 of the
conclusions of law is to the same effect.
The parties involved are individuals of limited
means, and the vital importance of this provision is
apparent. Presumably both appellee and appellant,
David H. Nicewinter, placed substantial sums of money
into the reconstruction and improvement of this apartment building, which investments consumed the available assets of both individuals. David L. Nicewinter
asserts that his investment is in excess of $12,000.00.
The net effect of the order, however, is to allow appellee
a credit for a claimed investment of $8,000.00, but appellant, David H. Nicewinter, whose interest should be of
greater or at least equal standing, has no credit of any
kind available. Thus, at the sale, the appellee was in a
position to bid the sum of $8,000.00 or even a lesser
amount, and it is entirely probable that appellant, David
H. Nicewinter, could not by any stretch of the imagination exceed this amount. In net effect, therefore, the
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likelihood was that appellee, with a bid of $8,000.00 or
less without any cash, would not only acquire a property
worth upwards of $20,000.00, but at the same time would
"Tipe out an equity of the appellant, David H. Nicewinter, of at least $12,000.00. There is certainly nothing
contemplated in the stipulation between the parties
(R. 20) which would permit in any way such a result,
and the finding, conclusion and the decree most certainly violate the most primitive concepts of justice.
Appellants' objections (R. 33) were entirely ignored.
Although the decree clearly contemplates a later and
ultimate accounting, and in no part of the proceedings
has there ever been such an account, the net effect of
this decree is a partial accounting, not based upon evidence, granting to appellee an unjustly advantageous
position at time of sale.
It is also noted that the decree provides that there
shall be only two bidders at the sale, appellee, Glen
L. Nicewinter, and appellant, David H. Nicewinter. The
contract of purchase of the property (R. 19), however,
vests the equities of the same in Geneva C. and David

H. Nicewinter as joint tenants. Throughout the proceedings and particularly this provision of the decree,
the one-half interest of Geneva C. Nicewinter, appellant, has been completely ignored. It is again inconceivable that any court could in effect wipe out such an
interest "\vithout any foundation to do so, either in fact
or in law.
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It may be claimed by the appellee that the stipulation (R. 20) justifies the action of the court. As has
been indicated above, the decree and findings of the
court extend far beyond the scope of this stipulation,
which says nothing as to the finding of $8,000.00 due
appellee, nor of the existence of a credit in this amount
available to him at the sale. Moreover, it is extremely
doubtful as to whether the stipulation refers to the
same contract as that introduced in evidence as it refers
to "that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated
September 25, 1947, between Marie M. Diener as seller
and David H. Nicewinter and Glen L. Nicewinter as
purchasers * * * ." Examination of the only contract
in the record, Exhibit "A" (R. 19), shows that it is not
the same as that above described. The purchasers under
this exhibit are not David H. Nicewinter and Glen L.
Nicewinter, but Dave H. Nicewinter and Geneva C.
Nicewinter, his wife, as joint tenants. Again, emphasis
on the fact that the proceedings completely ignore appellant Geneva C. Nicewinter. In this connection, we point
out that this stipulation is not executed by the parties,
but only by counsel of record, and further that Marie
M. Diener, party defendant, is not in any way connected
with or party signator on the stipulation, nor is there
anything to show that she was even aware of its existence. As vendor and title holder to the real property
involved, she most certainly has a direct interest in the
proceedings, which appellee recognized at the outset
of the case as she was made a party defendant.
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Applicable law in regard to the necessity of eVIdence upon which to base a finding of fact is well established by this court. In Hathaway v. United Tintic
Mines Co., 42 Utah 520, 132 P. 388, at page 522 the
Court states :
"The finding of facts and entering of judgments are solemn acts, and no court should permit
itself to make a finding of fact where the record
is conclusive, as in this case, that there is absolutely no evidence to support such finding."
The relation between conclusions of law and findings of fact is well stated in Parrott Bros. Vo. v. Ogden
City, 50 Utah 512, 167 P. 807, at page 515:
"It is fundamental that the conclusions of law
must be predicted upon and find their support in
the findings of fact, and the judgment must follow
the conclusions of law; and where, as here, the
conclusions of law are so palpably at variance
with the findings, there is no alternative but to
order and require the lower court to set aside its
erroneous conclusions of law and substitute conclusions that will entitle the appellant to, and
enter, a judgment in accordance with its express
findings of fact."
See also Friedli v. Friedli, 65 Utah 605, 238 P. 647;
Needham v. First National Bank of Salt Lake City, 96
Utah 432, 85 P. (2d) 785.
We believe it is apparent under the authorities that
there is absolutely no foundation upon which the decree
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and the conclussions can be based, either in the evidence
itself, which is in reality non-existent, or the findings of
fact. These errors are extremely prejudicial, and place
appellant, David H. Nicewinter, in a wholly untenable
position. Moreover, and as we have indicated above,
it ignores the interest of Geneva C. Nicewinter, and the
actual owner of the property, Marie M. Diener.
Points Nos. 4 and 5
Paragraph 2 of the decree (R. 31), and paragraph
4 of the conclusions of law (R. 23, 24), are concerned with
essentially the same matter, and since they are the paragraphs upon which the above point::; are based, will be
argued together. For the convenience of the court, these
paragraphs are set forth as follows:
Decree
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said sale shall be
conducted in the courtroom of Judge Ray Van
Cott, Jr., at 9 :15 o'clock A. M. on F·riday, the
9th day of March, 1951, and that notice of said
sale shall be given by serving upon the said
Franklin Dunn Richards, attorney, a notice thereof at least five days prior to said sale, and that
the property and premises herein referred to are
described as :
Commencing at a point 2 rds. North of
the Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18,
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 4 rds. ; thence East 10 rds. ~
thence South 4 rds.; thence West 10 rds. to
the place of beginning, subject to and toSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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gether with a contract dated September 25,
1947, with Marie M. Diener, seller, and to-gether with all furniture, furnishings and
appliances appertaining to said joint venture
premises, and"
Conclusions of Law
"That the property and premises herein referred to are located in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and particularly described as:
Commencing at a point 2 rds. North of
the Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18,
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, and rrmning thence North 4 rds. ; thence East 10 rds. ;
thence South 4 rds. ; thence West 10 rds. to
the place of beginning, subject to and together with a contract dated September 25,
1947, with Marie M. Diener, seller, and together with all furniture, furnishings and appliances appertaining to said joint venture
premises."
The above portion of the decree places the time
of sale at 9 :15 A. M. on Friday, the 9th day of March,
1951, and provides for service of notice thereof upon
counsel for appellants. The paragraph also proceeds
to describe the property involved in the sale by metes
and bounds, and then adds, "together with all furniture,
furnishings and appliances appertaining to said joint
venture premises *". For the first time in these proceedings and litigation, the personal property located in this
apartment house comes to light in this order of sale.
No mention is made of this personal property in the
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complaint (R. 1), nor in the answer (R. 10), nor in the
so-called answer to counterclaim (R. 13). No mention
is made of thiS personal property in the previous decree
(R. 26), nor in the findings upon which such previous
decree was based, and particularly paragraph 2 thereof
(R. 27). Paragraph 4 of the findings in the instant case
describes the property (R. 22) as being solely real property, without mention of any pe-rsonality or furnishings.
Nor is such mention made elsewhere in the findings of
the instant case, upon which the conclusions of law and
the decree are based. In other words, the court has
suddenly included in the subject of litigation and order
of sale, personal property not heretofore mentioned or
involved. It is impossible to understand by what right
or authority the trial court ordered the sale of this personal property, and to~ do so is highly and irrevocably
prejudicial to the appellants herein. For all that appears
in the record, this may involve property, for example,
of the appellant, Geneva C. Nicewinter, used in her
personal apartment, or it may involve property on the
premises owned and belonging to the seller, Marie M.
Diener. There is clearly cause, upon this ground alone,
to remand this case for a new trial.
Point No.6
Paragraph 5 of the findings of fact (R. 22) reads as
follows:
"5. That said property is being purchased
from defendant Marie M. Diener and that defendant Geneva C. Nicewinter is the wife of David
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H. Nicewinter and has some statutory interest
in defendant David H. Nicewinter's interest
therein."
As we have previously pointed out, the appellant,
Geneva C. Nicewinter, under the terms of contract of
purchase of the property here involved, Exhibit "A"
(R. 19), was one of two purchasers in joint tenancy,
and presumably as a result of this written contract,
she had a one-half interest in the real property. Notwithstanding this evidence, which cannot be contradicted,
this finding recites that her interest is "some statutory
interest in defendant, David H. Nicewinter's interest
therein." This is a manifest error, and constitutes a
concrete illustration of the manner in which the findings and decree have ignored a very definite property
interest. Not only, moreover, has this interest been
ignored, but the finding in net effect sets up a vague
'

interest which it is submitted does not exist. The importance of this error lies not only in the fact that this
property interest has been ignored, but also in the fact
that it indicates one of the premises by which the court
has totally ignored the rights of appellant Geneva C.
Nicewinter insofar as division of proceeds of sale and
profits from the venture are concerned.
Point No.7
This point is concerned with paragraph 7 of the findings of fact (R. 22), which paragraph reads as follows:
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"7. This court further found that each of
said brothers and his wife shall have reasonable
living quarters out of said premises pending sale
thereof and further ordered that within a reasonable time said premises shall be sold to the best
advantage and thereupon an accounting shall be
made between them in accordance with the terms
of this order, and;"
Paragraph 7 of the complaint alleges that the court,
in the preceding case, found that the parties "shall have
reasonable living quarters out of said premises pending
the sale thereof." This is denied in paragraph 2 of the
answer (R. 10). The above finding of fact repeats the
allegation of the complaint, and yet there is not a scintilla
of evidence in this record upon which such finding could
be based. Again, there is an illustration of the manner
in which the lower court has followed the allegations of
the complaint which had been denied, and thereby placed
in direct issue, without any foundation upon which it
could do so.
Point No.8
This point is concerned with paragraph 8 of the findings of fact (R. 22), which reads as follows:
"8. That a reasonable time has now expired
but said premises have not been sold."
As in regard to Point No. 7 above, this is an instance
where the complaint, in paragraph 8 (R. 2), makes an
allegation of fact which is denied by the answer, and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
again, there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record
upon which any such finding could be predicated, and to
make such a finding is again manifest error.
Point No.9
This point is concerned with paragraph 9 of the
findings of fact (R. 23), which reads as follows:
"9. That defendant David H. Nicewinter
received approximately $400.00 per month gross
rentals from said premises, for which he has made
no accounting to plaintiff, notwithstanding plaintiff's demand therefore and notwithstanding that
said business is a joint venture."
Paragraph 9 of the complaint (R. 2) alleges that
appellant, David H. Nicewinter, received approximately
$400.00 per month gross rentals from said premises,
which allegation is denied in the answer. Once again,
there is no evidence in the record to support this finding of fact, it is clearly error, and is again indicative of
the manner in which the trial court has followed the allegations of the complaint in its findings, without any
foundation of fact or stipulation upon which to do so.
Moreover, since the decree contemplates an ultimate
accounting between these parties, such a finding, which
we are advised is contrary to the facts, may ultimately
prove of substantial importance, as it definitely fixes an
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Income and receipt of monies from the property. The
finding is moreover vague, because it fails to specify
the period during which this sum is allegedly received
by appellant, David H. Nicewinter, and again may be
of importance because this joint venture was established
for a defined and limited period.
CONCLUSION
Appellants are fully cognizant of the limited citation
of authority for the assertions contained in the argument. The principles of law, however, would seem to be
so well established and free from ambiguity that further
authority would be merely surplusage.
It is submitted that the seriousness and frequency of
prejudicial error which has occurred in this action, not
only makes it utterly impossible to determine with any
degree of accuracy the rights and respective positions
of the parties, particularly Geneva C. Nicewinter, but
that these proceedings are so thoroughly confused that
there is only one possible solution. A new trial should
be granted, which will necessarily give, and in reality
for the first time, all parties concerned an opportunity
to present adequate evidence in support of their respective positions and rights, to attain

~

equitable account-
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ing of this joint venture, and if deemed advisable, a sale
of the premises and definition of property involved in
the sale, which will be consistent with justice.
We submit that more than any case within our experience, however limited that experience may be, this
case is one wherein a new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY
and WILLIAM T. THURMAN
Attorneys for Appellants
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